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The rhetoric of Newton’s first paper
that of youth: brash and brilliant, relying for its persuasive 
effect on a clash of principles, a de
and unequivocally presented. In contrast…the rhetoric of the 
Opticks was that of late middle age: a canny and successful 
attempt to transform a youthful invention into a durable 
inheritance.  
—
In 2006, ten years after the appearance of a second edition of his 
book The Rhetoric of Science
revision (a “major refiguring,” in his own words) of his original 
attempt to frame a disciplinary identity for the
(Gross, 1990a: 1st 
edition in and of itself marks
position of the first
rhetorical “without remainder” (Gro
edition seems to stand as the emblem of a much more thorough
going volte-face, with its contents extensively revised, replaced, and 
reordered. Even its title changed, to 
Rhetoric in Science Studies.
confident and expansive original title and the revamped one 
recapitulates in brief the shift in Gross’s thinking
more properly, in his strategy
decade and a half. As rhetoricians
with the way that texts are deployed to garner intellectual and 
institutional support for scholarly efforts, we must find Gross’s 
move to be of extraordinary interest, and not only for self
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—riveting to this day—
cisive confrontation, clearly 
Alan G. Gross, Starring the Text (2006, 72
, Alan Gross published an extensive 
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edition, 1996: 2nd edition). While the second 
 a slight retreat from the radical 
—with its provocative hypothesis that science is 
ss, 1990a, 33)—the third 
Starring the Text: The Place of 
 The difference between the far more 
—or, perhaps 
—over the space of more than a 
 of science, concerned as we are 
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-
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reasons. As a case study in disciplinarity and its discontents, 
Gross’s shift from announcing the existence of a field in 1990 to 
making the case for its place at the multi-disciplinary table of 
science studies in 2006 promises to be instructive. 
Before proceeding, some discussion of the nature of 
disciplinarity is warranted. Within science, a discipline acts 
both through and upon its adherents (see Prior, 1994), 
organizing knowledge-producing resources in response to 
institutional pressures and intellectual exigencies (Good, 
2000) while at the same time establishing the object of 
inquiry for its members ontologically (Shepherd, 1993). 
Sullivan (1996) notes a further tension, in that scientists are 
expected to respect the traditions of their field but at the same 
time required to make novel contributions to it (224). He 
describes disciplinarity as operating via orthodoxies—
hierarchical systems of canonical narratives, doctrines, 
methods, and commonplaces that represent the shared vision 
of a field (226-229). In their work, scholars legitimate 
themselves in the context of a discipline by “projecting an 
orthodox, yet progressive, ethos” (233), signaling knowledge 
and acceptance of most of a field’s paradigmatic touchstones 
while challenging a few in order to say something relevant and 
worthwhile. In this way, disciplines are able to engage in 
knowledge production despite a deeply conservative impulse 
that, in seeking to sustain an existing community and 
maintain its intellectual rigor, serves as a barrier to the new 
(Wilder, 2005).  
From this perspective, the function of a discipline is primarily 
evaluative, serving to order the activities of scholars within a 
disciplinary community. To the extent that Gross’s move from The 
Rhetoric of Science to Starring the Text marks a retreat from 
explicit disciplinary claims, the recalcitrance of disciplinarity is 
made more clearly visible to us. In other words, since disciplines 
are not natural and inevitable orderings of the world, but are 
instead the contingent outcomes of human action, it takes effort to 
create, sustain, and defend them—and sometimes that effort will 
meet resistance.  
Acts of Reference as Signs of Discipline  
This investigation is a reception study in the rhetoric of science 
(Paul, Charney, and Kendall, 2001), reflexively applied to the 
rhetoric of science itself. This is familiar ground, to be sure 
(Ceccarelli, 2005), but this study augments previous efforts at 
disciplinary self-reflection in the rhetoric of science by examining 
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scholarly citations to Alan Gross’s The Rhetoric of Science and 
Starring the Text in context in order to describe the uses to which 
other scholars put it. If “the production of science is born of its 
reception,” as Harris asserts, then such an approach can provide 
insight into the way disciplines are constituted in scholarly 
discourse (Harris, 2005, 254).  
Citations provide access to the discursive constitution of 
disciplines in science, as long as one is prepared to stipulate their 
rhetorical character—specifically, as multivalent forensic 
metonyms: i.e., as figures of speech oriented toward truth-claims 
and capable of multiple interpretations by virtue of their 
referentiality (see Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff, 1989; Cano, 
1989; Cozzens, 1989; Gilbert, 1977; Small, 1978; Wouters, 1999). It 
should be noted that pointed caveats about the limitations of 
citations as measures of scientific work have been issued (Edge, 
1979; Ferber, 1986; Zuckerman, 1987). More recently, Baldi asserts 
that there is little support for a “constructionist” perspective on 
citations in which they persuade by drawing upon the cognitive 
authority of high-status authors rather than merely acknowledging 
intellectual influence per the norms of citation behavior (Baldi, 
1998). Note, however, that this charge proceeds from a rather 
blinkered view of how citations might operate rhetorically in 
scholarly writing. Writers need not rely be relying on another 
author’s “high status” and may yet still be seeking to persuade by 
making a reference to that author’s work. An alternate line of 
criticism notes how citation analysis serves to reify its object of 
study (i.e., a scholarly community) in a way that renders it 
amenable to the operations of institutional power (Hicks and 
Potter, 1991). Nonetheless, once we posit citations as rhetorical, it 
follows that their employment establishes disciplinary ties among 
authors as well as discursive ties among texts. Paul suggests that 
examining citation patterns in conjunction with the specifics of a 
text in which those citations appear permits “insights into the 
community in which a text is created” (Paul, 2000, 186). As Gilbert 
says:  
It is important to note that an author, in choosing one 
collection of papers to cite, is not only providing support 
for his [sic] own paper, but is also implicitly displaying 
an allegiance to a particular section of the scientific 
community; namely, that section which is collectively of 
the opinion that the cited papers deserve (affirmative or 
negational) citation. Moreover, in citing certain papers, 
the author...is...contributing...to the overall consensus of 
his [sic] research area (Gilbert, 1977, 117).  
 William J. White 4 Poroi 10,2 (December 2014) 
This discipline-defining quality of citations allows them to be 
thought of as micro-level efforts at what Fuller calls 
interdisciplinary interpenetration (Fuller, 1993, 64). In citing 
another’s work, in other words, an author is attempting discursively 
to position that work in a conceptual space that is fundamentally 
disciplinary in character, in the sense that citations produce (a) 
aggregations of individual work that constitute the discipline’s 
knowledge base (i.e., a research front and the history of intellectual 
contributions that led there), and (b) aggregations of individual 
authors that constitute the discipline as a professional collective 
(Leydesdorff, 1998). We will return to Fuller’s concept of 
interpenetration, using it as a tool for examining how scholars cite 
Gross in text.  
Drafted into the Science Wars  
Before looking at specific citation contexts (i.e., how Gross is cited 
in text within scholarly articles), it will be useful to examine the 
broader situation in which those citations occur. This account 
begins by discussing author co-citations with Gross within the 
literature that refers to The Rhetoric of Science. Author co-citation 
analysis (White, 1990; White and Griffith, 1982) is a bibliometric 
method (i.e., a quantitative technique that uses the characteristics 
of a text-based corpus as data) that analyzes the patterns of co-
occurrence of scholars on reference lists to map the intellectual 
structures of academic communities; it assumes that author names 
represent their oeuvres. The first part of the analysis here is 
straightforward and limited, serving only as a point of entry to a 
broader discussion. It identifies an “ego-centered” co-citation 
network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 42) with Gross as “ego” and 
those authors most frequently appearing in the same reference lists 
with him as “alters.” The point of this procedure is to characterize 
the intellectual climate (a) within which specific citations to Gross’s 
work should be read, and (b) that shaped the exigence driving 
Gross’s subsequent alterations to The Rhetoric of Science.  
Between 1990 and 2011 there were 248 citations to any of the 
three editions of Gross’s book (i.e., Gross, 1990a, 1996, 2006) 
recorded in the Web of Knowledge database (ISI, 2012). To obtain a 
subset to examine, complete citation data were obtained for all 
articles citing Gross from 1990 through 2004—i.e., before the 
publication of Starring the Text, on the premise that these 
references constituted the reception of Gross’s work to which the 
third edition was a response. This resulted in a matrix of 156 citing 
articles (i.e., 63% of all citations to any edition of Gross’s book) by 
4927 cited authors. Table 1 shows the authors most co-cited with 
 William J. White 5 Poroi 10,2 (December 2014) 
Gross within those articles (i.e., appearing in the same reference list 
with him) in the data set.  
Table 1 
Gross and Authors Most Co-Cited With Him, 1990-2004  
Author  Mean Std Dev Sum  
GROSS_AG  0.955 0.210  149  
LATOUR_B  0.429  0.495 67  
BAZERMAN_C    0.288 0.453 45  
MYERS_G  0.276 0.447 43  
KUHN_TS 0.231  0.421 36  
PRELLI_LJ  0.212 0.408  33  
SHAPIN_S  0.192 0.394 30  
KNORRCETINA_KD 0.186 0.389 29  
FOUCAULT_M  0.179 0.384  28  
FULLER_S  0.154 0.361 24  
WOOLGAR_S  0.128  0.334 20  
PERELMAN_C 0.122  0.327  19  
HARAWAY_DJ 0.122  0.327 19  
GILBERT_GN 0.122  0.327  19  
COLLINS_HM  0.115  0.319  18  
HACKING_I 0.109  0.312 17  
SIMONS_HW  0.109 0.312 17  
HARDING_SG 0.103  0.303 16  
RORTY_R 0.103 0.303  16  
DEAR_P  0.103 0.303 16  
MULKAY_M 0.096 0.295 15  
POPPER_KR 0.096  0.295 15  
TOULMIN_SE 0.096  0.295 15  
FEYERABEND_PK 0.096 0.295  15  
BLOOR_D 0.096  0.295 15  
PERA_M 0.096  0.295 15  
Note. “Mean” refers to the % of cases in which the co-cited 
author appears. Gross appears in fewer than 100% of cases 
because self-citations were removed.  
Theoretically, the set of those most co-cited with a focal author, as 
Gross is here, serves to position that author within a conceptual 
space, with author names serving metonymically to represent their 
work. In the case of Gross, those who appear on reference lists with 
him frequently are associated with (a) rhetoric and text-focused 
studies of science as writing, including the rhetoric of science (i.e., 
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Bazerman, Dear, Myers, Pera, Perelman, Prelli, Simons),1 (b) 
philosophy of science (Feyerabend, Hacking, Kuhn, Popper) and of 
knowledge (Foucault, Fuller, Rorty), and particularly (c) sociology 
of science, particularly that concerned with the social construction 
or epistemological relativism of scientific knowledge (Bloor, Collins, 
Haraway, Harding, Knorr-Cetina, Latour, Mulkay, Shapin, 
Woolgar). Those citing Gross may do so for a variety of reasons, but 
in aggregate the patterns of co-citation suggest that his work is 
generally seen as occupying an intellectual position relevant to the 
intersection of those concerns.  
This perception of Gross should not be surprising, given the 
nature of the claims made in his book. “If scientific texts are to be 
analyzed rhetorically,” he declares, Aristotelian strictures regarding 
the scope of rhetoric need to be discarded and “the spirit of the first 
Sophistic must roam free” (Gross, 1990, 3). As Trevor Melia 
reminds us, that spirit is a kind of epistemic skepticism that 
informs a world-view in which persuasion is, however reluctantly, 
conceded to mediate between knowledge and truth, since the latter 
is not available with any certainty to human mind (Melia, 1992). 
And while it is possible to read such an invocation in a modest 
way—as a call for playful experimentation, perhaps—critics both 
from within rhetoric or speech communication as a field (e.g., 
Campbell and Benson, 1996; Gouran, 1992) and from outside.  
(Agassi, 1999; Wynn, 1992) consistently take Gross to be suggesting 
a radical transformation of our conceptions of both rhetoric and 
science.  
                                                    
1It would require an essay of some length to adequately encompass the 
intellectual and disciplinary distinctions among this group of scholars. 
Perelman is associated with a neo-Aristotelian reclamation, revitalization, 
and extension of the rhetorical tradition. His New Rhetoric (with 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) is a seminal work. Gross places Bazerman (an 
“English professor” [1990b, 305]) and Prelli, along with himself, among 
the “first generation” of scholars enacting an “emerging rhetorical 
consciousness” in the study of science (Gross, 2008). Simons is an early 
figure in the rhetoric of inquiry more generally (see Simons, 1980, 1990, 
1999). Myers’ perspective is literary critical. Dear is an historian of 
science. Both have written on rhetoric and science (Melia, 1992). Pera 
comes in for criticism from Gross for theoretical incoherence: “I do not 
see how Pera can profess a deflationary metaphysics, a metaphysics that 
embodies a notion of reference wholly internal to discourse, and at the 
same time, affirm a deflationary view of rhetoric” (Gross 1995b, 254). 
Campbell and Benson discuss several of these authors, assigning Gross 
and Myers to the radical rhetoric of science; Bazerman, Prelli, and Pera 
(whom they identify as a philosopher of science) to the moderate 
program; and Dear as exemplifying the “literary moderate” in the 
rhetorical turn in science studies (Campbell and Benson, 1996). 
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In The Rhetoric of Science, Gross sought to show that rhetoric 
was fundamentally constitutive of science by pointing to the vital 
role of rhetoric in the enactment of scientific rationality. 
Specifically, he offered demonstrations of (1) the heuristic value of 
analogy (Gross, 1996, 21-32), (2) the persuasive character of 
seemingly objective taxonomy (33-53), and (3) the dynamic 
presence of narrative in scientific argument (54-65). He argued for 
a concept of realism—an “essentially contested” term (193-194)—
that is congenial to a rhetorical perspective on science. This 
motivational realism asserts that “the existence of mind-
independent entities” is a belief particularly well suited to the 
conduct of science (200). However, according to Gross, truth 
emerges elsewhere—not from the correspondence of theory with 
reality, but from the correspondence of theory with experience, 
both of which are “in our heads” (Gross, 1996, 202).  
It should be acknowledged that this methodological 
phenomenalism or agnosticism with respect to reality is 
characteristic of other so-called “radical” programs in science 
studies. For example, Bloor’s “strong program” in the sociology of 
knowledge made the assumption of “symmetry,” i.e., that both 
correct and incorrect beliefs were to be explained as outcomes of 
the same process, because it would be incoherent for sociological 
explanations of why people hold certain beliefs to rely on the 
correspondence of those beliefs with reality as a causal factor in 
some cases and not in others (Bloor, 1976). Latour’s “anthropology” 
of laboratory science goes even further, arguing for a tangled 
hybridity of human actors, non-human objects, and immaterial 
ideas such that “the fate of facts...is in later users’ hands” (Latour, 
1987, 259; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). He concludes that 
knowledge is therefore reflexive, helping to constitute the world 
that it purports to describe (Latour, 1988; Woolgar, 1988).  
To be fair, Ceccarelli notes that “when asked to bracket the 
philosophical issue and talk about the practice of rhetorical 
criticism with respect to the realism/anti-realism debate, Alan 
Gross acknowledges that a scholar must at the very least hold to 
Arthur Fine’s conception of ‘common sense reality’ (which one 
assumes to exist but which cannot be characterized independently 
of the observer)” (Ceccarelli, 2001, 326, n. 2). Nonetheless, the 
authors most closely associated with Gross via co-citation ties, 
particularly the philosophers and the sociologists, have come in for 
heavy criticism about their relativistic disregard for science’s ability 
to get at truth (see, e.g., Cole, 1997; Haack, 1997; Kenshur, 1997; 
McGuire and Melia, 1989). So Gross’s work is implicated in the 
“Science Wars” that fulminated in the 1990s. Gross himself found 
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this fact regrettable. “Surely,” he said, “there is something wrong 
with using another human being’s work as a missile in a war not of 
his making” (Gross, 2000, 449).  
In any event, his critics certainly interpret Gross as taking sides 
with respect to the broader issues in the study of science. Melia 
notes that in addition to drawing on a small but growing rhetoric of 
science literature, Gross “depends on congenial studies deriving 
from the ‘Strong Program’ in the sociology of knowledge from 
which he is nevertheless anxious to differentiate his own 
undertaking” (Melia, 1992; Bloor, Collins, et al., 101). Gouran finds 
it “unfortunate” that in attempting to describe the “vital role” that 
rhetoric plays in science, “Gross becomes so concerned with de-
privileging science he ironically seeks to privilege rhetoric in ways 
that are not warranted by its current epistemological status” 
(Gouran, 1992, 273).  
Agassi is less gentle, saying that Gross confuses “rhetoric as 
garnish with rhetoric as the main dish” (Agassi, 1999, 33). He 
claims to be unconvinced by Gross’s arguments. “That style matters 
is trivially true and that style is all that matters is trivially false” 
(329). He goes on to say that “the translation of [Gross’s] book to 
remove its exaggerations...will remove from it the absurd thesis and 
land it in the trivial one” (329). Ultimately, he finds Gross under-
informed (“Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré disputed the matter; 
we should not expect Gross to be familiar with all this,” 334), and 
warns rhetoricians and others of their ilk to stay on the margins of 
real science Agassi and Wynne are leery of Gross’s disciplinary 
aspirations for the rhetoric of science (Agassi, 1999; Wynne, 1992). 
Agassi relies on sarcasm. Gross has declared rhetoric of science to 
be, “a real academic discipline,” Agassi observes. “Since all study is 
legitimate, and any area may be deemed a field or a discipline, the 
message is that rhetoric deserves a university department. This 
means much bread; hence, faultfinders may expect a mean 
rebuttal” (Agassi, 1999, 329). Wynne by contrast is earnest. She 
fears that “an acceptance of the rhetoric of science would be 
sociological death,” since Gross’s analytic assumption that the 
meaning of a text is relatively easy to obtain amounts to a 
psychologically reductionist privileging of the intentionality of the 
author that would “obviate the intellectual enterprise of sociology 
altogether” (Wynne, 1992, 93).  
The Very Idea of Rhetoric  
By the time of Agassi’s attack (a late hit, to be sure), Gross had 
already begun to retreat from the strong position laid out in the 
first edition of the book—the claim that science is rhetorical 
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“without remainder” (Gross, 1990a, 33), and grounded in a belief in 
the thoroughgoing social construction of reality. By 1994, Gross 
would explain that the book was not, as accused, intended to show 
“‘that scientists are really just rhetoricians, which is nonsense’, but 
that scientists are engaged in the process of persuasion in all of 
their professional and intellectual activities, not only in the forum, 
but also in the laboratory, the field, and the study” (Gross, 1994, 3).  
In 1996, the second edition of The Rhetoric of Science was 
augmented with a prefatory apologia that attempted to summarize 
developments since its original publication (This preface would 
form the bulk of the first chapter of Starring the Text). It positioned 
the first edition as the product of a particular historical moment, 
which it had been necessary to declare the existence of a field called 
rhetoric of science in order for the perception to exist that there was 
in fact such a field at all (Gross, 1996, viii). The book’s contents 
then demonstrated that nascent discipline’s possibility, breadth, 
and potential for insight. Writing six years after the first edition, 
Gross called for the next generation of rhetoricians of science to 
build on this foundation and create a coherent field. He envisioned 
a well-coordinated and philosophically well-grounded intellectual 
endeavor—a discipline indeed—that would bring together disparate 
threads of research in order to move beyond the conceptual 
boundaries and methodological limitations of the field. 
The relationship between philosophy and rhetoric had been a 
persistent concern of Gross’s (see, e.g., Gross, 1990b, 1995a), but 
the debate among rhetoricians over Gaonkar’s challenge to the 
globalization of rhetoric, exemplified as he saw it by the rhetoric of 
science, seemed to crystallize this concern, driving many of the 
accommodations Gross would subsequently make. Gaonkar found 
it striking that rhetoric should be taken by so many as a 
“hermeneutic metadiscourse” capable of redescribing other 
discourses and thus dissolving them into itself superordinately 
(Gaonkar, 1993, 258).  In its origins it was limited in scope to the 
courts, the assembly, and the funeral or festival ground, and in 
application to the production of speech rather than its 
interpretation. Previous efforts to expand the reach of rhetoric, 
Gaonkar argues, had failed. The classical rhetorical vocabulary had 
proven itself “far too narrow, far too normative, and far too 
rationalistic” to sustain a neo-Aristotelian program of criticism in 
the mid-20th century, in the wake of which failure followed a 
pluralization of critical methods (which nonetheless concealed a 
recuperation of the classical tradition) and an ongoing tendency 
toward the globalization of rhetoric, facilitated by the work of 
Kenneth Burke who had remarked that, “Wherever there is 
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persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is ‘meaning’, there 
is ‘persuasion’” (Gaonkar, 1993, 262; see Burke, 1950, 172, cited in 
Schiappa, 2001, 261). According to Gaonkar’s analysis, any 
coherent scheme for producing a “rhetoric of X” (291-292) requires 
(a) a more satisfying theory of the subject than the humanistic 
valorization of rhetor-as-agent that characterized the classical 
tradition, (b) the ability to accommodate a wider range of discursive 
categories than classical rhetoric possessed, and (c) a theoretical 
vocabulary that permits falsification and thereby corrigibility 
(Gaonkar, 1993, 263-264). Gaonkar identified the rhetoric of 
science as a site where the historical forces operating on 
universalized rhetoric—a disciplinary dialectic of repression and 
recognition—were clearly in evidence and were thus amenable to 
examination (Gaonkar, 1993, 265).  
Gross was among those singled out for criticism by Gaonkar, 
who found him unable to convincingly link his professed (if not 
actually all that much in evidence, said Gaonkar) neo-Aristotelian 
methodology with his social constructionist, SSK-aligned 
theoretical allegiances (Gaonkar, 1993, 282-285). Tellingly, 
Gaonkar noted Gross’s concern with “starring the text,” a term 
taken from Barthes, meaning to foreground or otherwise privilege 
the artifacts of discourse (Gaonkar, 1993, 283).  
Initially, Gross seems not to have been terribly alarmed by 
Gaonkar’s accusations.2  He regarded them “less as dismissal than 
as admonition” to avoid the rote rhetorical re-description of texts, 
to strive for theoretical reflexivity, to forthrightly address 
intertextuality, and to employ case studies more systematically 
(Gross, 1993, 304).  
Certainly, as the impresario of the conference session at which 
Gaonkar’s paper was first presented and co-editor of the collection 
of essays in which it was ultimately published (Keith and Gross, 
1997) following its initial print appearance (Gaonkar, 1993), Gross 
must have expected the colloquy to be salubrious. Even at his most 
radical, Gross was committed to philosophically coherent rhetoric 
of science. “There is nothing wrong with rhetoricians doing 
philosophy,” he claimed, “so long as they get it right....To validate 
the philosophy we undoubtedly need, we must make it our business 
to cross the line, to talk to philosophers on their own turf” (Gross, 
1990b, 305).  
                                                    
2 Although other readers have found Gross’s “fretfully titled” response 
replete with anxiety (Harris, 2009, 352).  
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In any case, Gross clearly took Gaonkar’s concerns to heart. 
When the second edition of The Rhetoric of Science appeared, 
readers noted a new tentativeness on his part, even as he continued 
to argue for the disciplinary prospects of the rhetoric of science 
(Lyne, 1999). “Gaonkar’s essay represents a reflective moment in 
which to meditate on the methodological limitations of the first 
generation of rhetoric of science,” Gross says, “limitations that a 
second generation [among whom he numbers a more seasoned 
version of himself] will address” (Gross, 2006, 14). And while the 
debate surrounding Gaonkar’s critique was “fruitless … vituperative 
… [and] best forgotten” (Gross and Gurak, 2005, 242), Gross insists 
that the essay marks an inflection point for rhetoricians of science 
of all sorts (Gross, 2008, for example)—despite the fact that he 
seems to be the only one affected in this way (Harris, 2009; 
Keränen, 2006).  
Gross’s subsequent work has decidedly been informed by 
Gaonkar’s admonitions. For example, Gross and his colleagues 
attempt a more systematic appraisal of 17th century scientific 
writing, gathering “a large, representative sampling of texts from 
three journals” (Gross, Harmon, and Reidy, 2000, 373) and 
interpreting the results in such a way as to reveal their sociological 
implications. Already in this work Gross is beginning to take the 
position that will motivate his refiguring of The Rhetoric of Science: 
“As rhetoric becomes even further integrated as a method within 
the sociology of scientific knowledge...scientific communities will 
more often be seen as communities whose communicative and 
persuasive practices constitute necessary conditions to the creation 
of new knowledge” (Gross, 1996, 371).  
A Bigger Picture  
Gross, to be sure, is reacting to the critical response to his work. 
Examining how Gross’s work is referred to in text when cited more 
generally—when other scholars try to use it, in other words— 
provides a complementary perspective to the critical reception of 
The Rhetoric of Science. To select a coherent subset of the 156 
articles citing Gross for the purpose of citation context analysis, an 
analysis of their bibliographic coupling was performed (Diodato, 
1994, 12-13; Martyn, 1964). This procedure involves the 
computerized calculation of which articles in a corpus tend to cite 
the same or similar authors.3  
                                                    
3A pair of articles is said to be “bibliographically coupled” when one or 
more of the same authors appears on both reference lists. The more 
authors that appear, the stronger is the coupling between the pair of 
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The citation matrix of 156 citing articles by 4927 cited authors 
was transformed using network analysis software (Borgatti, Everett, 
and Freeman, 2002) into a 156-by-156 citing article bibliographic 
coupling matrix, where the intersection of rows and columns 
indicates the number of cited authors any given pair of articles held 
in common. The bibliographic coupling matrix was then examined 
using hierarchical clustering, a procedure that creates a series of 
groupings of the citing articles at increasingly higher thresholds for 
authors in common clustering (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 381-
383). At the lowest level—with one author (i.e., Gross) in common—
all the articles belong to the same cluster. At the highest level, each 
article stands in isolation, assuming that no pair of articles share 
the exact same list of author references. (We in fact know from 
Table 1 that the next most frequently occurring author after Gross, 
Bruno Latour, appears in only about 43% of the articles).  
As an intermediate level of coupling permits broad patterns to 
be identified within the corpus, it was decided to choose the lowest 
clustering “partition” that put at least half of the articles into a 
group rather than leaving them as isolates. The partition that met 
this criterion grouped together articles that held a minimum of 5 
authors in common. This left only 48.7% of the articles as isolates; 
the next higher partition would have left 55.1% as isolates. In order 
to enable the visualization of the dataset, the isolates were removed 
and the remaining clusters were subjected to blockmodeling and 
multi-dimensional scaling procedures, which (a) treat the clusters 
established by prior analysis as nodes connected by bibliographic 
coupling ties and (b) graphically represent those ties by mapping 
them and the nodes they connect out in a two- dimensional space 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 287-289; 394-397). Figure 1 displays 
the results of those procedures. Each cluster is labeled with a 
descriptive name based on article titles within the cluster and sized 
according to the number of articles in it. Lines connect those 
clusters that have co-citation ties at a level greater than the mean of 
the block matrix as a whole; isolated clusters are indicated but their 
locations in the figure are not meaningful.  
Figure 1 below serves as a data reduction device; by enabling the 
structure of the entire corpus of articles to be visualized it allows 
subsets of putatively similar articles to be identified for closer 
examination. Where the clusters are small, the thematic or other 
                                                                                                                                                                    
articles. Analysis of bibliographic clustering thus does not reveal how 
cited authors are clustered (that is called co-citation analysis); instead, it 
identifies groups of citing articles with similar citation patterns whose 
content then must be examined to determine what thematic or other 
similarities the citing articles possess. 
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connection among the articles is usually easy to discern. In three 
cases, for example, pairs of articles with the same first author and 
similar topical foci are identified (i.e., O’Donoghue: Philosophy of 
Psychology, Safran: Medical Informatics, and Mercer: Citation 
Classification). As the clusters grow larger, thematic connections 
become less focused, and the labels assigned to them become mere 
convenience, a shorthand description rather than an analytic black 
box. For example, the six articles in the cluster labeled  
 
Figure 1. Bibliometric coupling clusters for articles citing  
Gross, 1990 or Gross, 1996 
Biological Images include discussions of visual representation in 
the biological sciences and medicine (Crawford, 1996; Douard, 
1995; Keirns, 1999) as well as arguments about scientific 
interpretation and authority using examples and illustrations 
drawn mainly from biology (Abir-Am, 1995; Allchin, 2003; Haack, 
1998). The theme emerges after some exploration of the cluster’s 
contents, and it is possible that a different reader would find other 
connections among the pieces grouped together by bibliographic 
coupling and thus give it a slightly different identifier.  
Thus, the label for the large central grouping in Figure 1—called 
Rhetorical Science Studies, since to call it the Rhetoric of Science 
would be at this point begging the question— reflects the sense that 
these 45 articles are in the main concerned with the scholarly 
analysis of science and its history in a way that foregrounds rhetoric 
and the rhetorical and addresses issues of epistemology and 
knowledge production more generally. Figure 2 allows the various 
conceptual foci of this cluster to be visualized by presenting a “word 
cloud” (from wordle.net) of its title words. In this image, words are 
scaled according to the frequency with which they recur among the 
article titles. “Science” is far and away the most common, followed 
by “rhetoric” in second place, with a third tier containing the words 
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“rhetorical,” “politics,” “public,” “history,” and “knowledge.” 
Quaternary terms contributing to the theme of the cluster include 
“metaphor,” “understanding,” “discourse,” “narratives,” and 
“invention” as well as “Darwin.”  
 
Figure 2. "Word Cloud" for Rhetorical Science Studies cluster  
The Rhetorical Science Studies cluster of Figure 1 will be the 
focus of the remainder of this paper. However, before moving 
forward it should be noted that Figure 1 presents an interesting 
view of the field in which Gross is implicated as a scholar. Centered 
upon rhetorical science studies, it ramifies in one direction toward 
an unself-conscious rhetoric of science focused on scientists’ use of 
linguistic resources to produce disciplined knowledge and in 
another direction toward the pragmatic scholarship of scientific, 
technical, and professional writing with an emphasis on the 
historical development of forms of written science. Tenuous 
connections to the scientometric (i.e., Mercer: Citation 
Classification) and the psychological (i.e., O’Donoghue: Philosophy 
of Psychology) literatures can also be glimpsed.  
Citation as Interpenetration:  
A Social Epistemological Method  
It is time now to return to the concept of interdisciplinary 
interpenetration and to disciplinarity more generally. Fuller 
advocates a social epistemology that is intensely interested in the 
question of disciplinarity (Fuller, 1988). He sees discipline as the 
fulcrum upon which internal and external (or sublime and profane) 
strategies of justification for scientific activities are balanced. He 
suggests that disciplines, via their commitment to establishing and 
maintaining disciplinary boundaries, are the fundamental vehicles 
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for the legitimation of knowledge enterprises. By 1993, Fuller has 
made explicit his rhetorical conception of disciplinarity, regarding 
disciplinary boundaries as emerging contingently and continuing 
conventionally rather than inevitably and necessarily.  
Fuller discusses the operation of disciplinarity in the context of 
the interactions of entire fields—“classical” with “naturalistic” 
epistemology (Fuller, 1993, 69-101), the history and philosophy of 
science (HPS) with science and technology studies (STS) (186-224), 
the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) with artificial 
intelligence (AI) research (139-185), and even the social sciences 
with the physical (102-138)—in terms intended to evoke the 
accommodations and sticking-points navigated in the encounters of 
disciplinary communities (Fuller 1993). As Fuller sees it, 
interdisciplinary interpenetration takes one of four forms (60-65, 
and elsewhere): (1) incorporation, in which one discipline positions 
itself as successor to another; (2) excavation, in which one 
discipline positions itself as diverging from another; (3) 
sublimation, in which one discipline positions another as ancillary 
to itself; and (4) reflexion, in which a discipline interrogates its own 
constitution.  
It does not take a very large conceptual leap to imagine applying 
Fuller’s broad-brush conception of disciplinary dynamics in a 
pointillist fashion, seeing individual acts of citation as operating to 
position an individual work in ties of incorporation, excavation, 
sublimation, and reflexion with other works. This requires some 
reformulation of Fuller’s concepts, of course, such that 
incorporation be taken to mean instances where prior work is 
presented as instrumental to a current one; excavation, where prior 
work is presented as somehow in error or needing correction; 
sublimation, as related but tangential; and reflexion, as essential to 
the current one but problematic in some way4. In other words, this 
investigation takes citation as a basic move in discipline-building at 
the intellectual level, involving one work building in 
                                                    
4While this scheme is similar to previous implementations of 
categories for citation context coding (Cano, 1989; Chubin and Moitra, 
1975; Moravcsik & Murugesan, 1975), particularly in classifying uses of 
citations as affirmative or negational and in regarding some uses as 
perfunctory, it has the advantage of occupying the four corners of a 
semiotic square (Greimas, 1983), and thus of delineating a more-or-less 
complete set of conceptual categories. In this case, “incorporation” serves 
as a simple positive term (S), opposed by “excavation” as a simple 
negative (not-S). The complex negative term (anti-S) is then 
“sublimation” (neither S nor not-S) while the complex positive term (anti 
not-S) is “reflexion” (both S and not-S).  
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(incorporation), digging out (excavation), papering over 
(sublimation), or holding up (reflexion) another. Essentially, this 
amounts to an argument by operationalization, an assertion that 
the dynamics of interpenetration said to be operating at the level of 
entire disciplines by Fuller also describe individual acts of 
scholarship, a kind of fractal model of the sciences in which it is 
“fish scales” (D. T. Campbell, 1969) all the way down. 
The Citation Fortunes of Alan Gross 
Forty of the 45 articles in the Rhetorical Science Studies cluster 
were obtained and the places in each article at which Gross was 
cited were found. Those places were interpreted as falling into one 
of the four categories of interdisciplinary interpenetration 
discussed above. Of the 40 articles examined in this group, 13 
(32.5%) appeared to be incorporation, 5 (12.5%) excavation, 19 
(47.5%) sublimation, and 3 (7.5%) reflexion. Each category is 
briefly presented in turn.  
INCORPORATION  
A citation was classified as incorporation if Gross was identified as 
an authoritative source for a certain claim, idea, or thought useful 
to the citer’s work. This category could be said to include Chubin 
and Moitra’s “affirmative essential” classifications, both basic and 
subsidiary (Chubin and Moitra, 1975). Of the 13, four appear in 
psychology journals while the others appear in science studies (3), 
rhetoric and speech communication (3), education (1), sociology 
(1), and women’s studies (1). Incorporative references were typically 
succinct, and took forms like these:  
[1] I draw heavily on the work of Alan Gross, who 
showed how Rheticus’s logic of discovery was a 
narrative of conversion (Brown, 1994, 4).  
[2] Gross has referred to the ‘self-effacement’ of the 
scientist to characterize the way in which the 
utilitarian language of the empirical disciplines 
systematically emphasizes the data or theory over 
the researcher as an individual (Madigan, 
Johnson, and Linton, 1995, 433).  
EXCAVATION  
A citation was classified as excavation if Gross was identified as the 
source of a problematic claim, thought, or idea that the citer 
explicitly rejected. Such citations would be negational in Chubin 
and Moitra’s (1975) scheme. Interestingly, most of these appeared 
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in interdisciplinary fora: two were published in philosophy journals 
and one appeared in a sociolinguistics journal. One each appeared 
in a science studies journal and a rhetoric/composition journal. 
Two examples follow:  
[3] The main reason for this [erroneous adherence to 
“ontological relativity” (151), despite its 
drawbacks], I suggest, is the widely shared view 
among contemporary thinkers in various 
disciplines—philosophy of science included—that 
language (or “discourse”) constitutes the absolute 
horizon of intelligibility for everything we can 
possibly claim to know about ourselves and the 
physical world [note]. See for instance [cites Gross 
and four others]. For realist counter-arguments 
from a range of philosophical perspectives, see 
also [cites 10 others]” (Norris, 1997, 154, 170)  
[4] The issue [of the role of argumentative reasoning 
or ‘witcraft’ in the public understanding of 
science”] arises in a particularly pertinent way in 
Gross’s brief remarks on the creation/evolution 
controversy, which he characterized as a debate 
between “biology and theology”....However, this 
misses the crucial point that very act of describing 
the controversy as between biology and theology is 
already a nonindependent description (Locke, 
2002, 102-103).  
SUBLIMATION  
A citation was classified as sublimation if Gross was presented as an 
exemplar of an intellectual enterprise tangential or parallel albeit 
still relevant to the citer’s work. In Chubin and Moitra’s terms, 
these references could be classified as “affirmative supplementary” 
(Chubin and Moitra, 1975). Most efforts at sublimation occurred 
outside the field of rhetoric/composition, with one cite in a speech 
communication journal falling into this category. Eight appeared in 
science studies journals (construed broadly to include history and 
philosophy of science). Four appeared in interdisciplinary social 
science journals. Two appeared in anthropology journals and one 
each appeared in a management journal, a political commentary 
journal, an education journal, and a chemistry Festschrift. 
Typically, the reference to Gross appears among a list of other 
ostensibly related citations. Two examples follow.  
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[5] The ritual of presenting experiments and the 
rhetoric of reporting unnatural events and 
unusual observations have been scrutinized” 
[footnote citing H.W. Simons, Gross, and Pera & 
Shea] (Harley, 1999, 408).  
[6] Shinn and Whitley, editing a volume on 
“expository science,” point to the essential 
similarities among all discourse that involves 
science, a topic that has been taken up in studies 
of the rhetoric of science. [endnote] For work on 
the rhetoric of science, see [Bazerman, Myers, and 
Gross] (Lewenstein, 1995, 404, 431-432) 
REFLEXION  
A citation was classified as reflexion if Gross was the object of a 
detailed assessment or evaluation whose main function seemed to 
be to salvage his work from what the citer considered to be a 
problematic or insufficiently well articulated theoretical 
commitment. They appeared in journals of rhetoric and speech 
communication. Two examples follow.  
[7] Alan Gross exploits this concept [of allegiance] 
without actually linking it to the word “allegiance” 
in his discussion of Copernicus and Rheticus. He 
uses the word in passing without comment...but 
he makes much of the relationship a bit 
later....When Gross uses verbs like “turn one’s 
back on” or “desert” in reference to abandoning 
the Ptolemaic system, he tacitly acknowledges the 
concept of allegiance (Sullivan, 1994, 253).  
[8] According to Gross, science is thoroughly 
rhetorical, since the production of scientific 
knowledge is a matter of persuasion and 
consensus. By implication, the rational 
reconstruction of science...has to be replaced by a 
“rhetorical reconstruction of science”...Gross’s 
conception is the most radical in contemporary 
rhetorical studies of science (Ginev, 1999, 249).  
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Table 2  
Citation Context Categories by Journal Type, Comparing Observed 
Frequencies With Those Expected By Chance  
 
 
Citation 
Context 
Journal Type 
 
Rhet/Comp & 
Speech Comm 
 
 
Sciences 
Studies 
 
 
Other 
 
 
Total 
Incorporation 3 (+0.4) 2 (-1.6) 8(+1.2) 13 
Excavation 1 (+0) 1(-0.4) 3(+0.4) 5 
Sublimation 1(-2.8) 8(+2.8) 10(+0) 19 
Reflexion 3(+2.4) 0(-0.8) 0(-1.6) 3 
Total 8 11 21 40 
Note. Observed frequencies differ from expected, 
.2(6)=16.6, p<.05. Because some expected frequencies are 
less than 5, the chance of Type I error may be greater than 
normal.  
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of citation context 
classifications across types of journals, classified as either (1) 
rhetoric/composition and speech communication, (2) science 
studies, or (3) other. Although the small number of cases means 
that statistical inferences are uncertain, the results are in line with 
what we would expect were the citation context categories indeed 
linked to interpenetrative disciplinary moves as argued above. 
Within rhetoric of science’s “home” in its English- and 
communication-specific journals, space exists for reflexion, which 
ultimately regards a cited work as meriting a recuperative 
interrogation. The implication is that “science studies” (i.e, the 
social and cultural investigation of science, using various social 
scientific methodologies and perspectives) is not rhetoric of 
science’s “home territory,” since the technique of sublimation 
positions a cited scholarly field as outside boundaries of the citing 
scholar’s work.  
It is in the context of trying to make science studies, broadly 
construed, more welcoming to rhetorical approaches that Gross’s 
move in recasting The Rhetoric of Science as Starring the Text 
should be understood. This essay briefly examines that move next.  
A Major Refiguring: Starring the Text  
Criticism from within and without the field of rhetoric seems to 
have motivated Gross to make changes in how he talked about the 
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role of rhetoric in relation to science and science studies. Certainly 
the change of titles for the book exemplifies this shift, as do the 
changes in its organization between editions.  
Table 3 describes the internal changes between the editions. The 
only change between the first and second edition is the inclusion of 
the preface summarized above, the effect of which was to 
“reposition” the disciplinary claims of the earlier work (Lyne, 1999, 
639). The “third edition” (Starring the Text) raises the 1996 Preface 
to the dignity of the first chapter (albeit revised and augmented 
with new material that updates Gross’s account of the history of 
rhetoric of science), re-numbering but otherwise leaving in place 
what had been the first three chapters so that they become Chapters 
2, 3, and 4. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in The Rhetoric of Science are 
scrapped while Chapters 7 through 10 are moved up to fill in the 
gap and reordered, becoming the new Chapters 5 through 8. New 
material is added to create Chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 11 remains 
in place and a new Chapter 12 replaces the old one. The chapters 
retained between the second and third editions are all renamed. 
The point of all of these changes, both substantive and nominal, 
seems to have been to position the book as demonstrating the range 
and utility of rhetorical approaches to studies of science. This is in 
contrast to the original argument of the book, which was to 
demonstrate the fully fledged capability of rhetoric to account for 
the outcomes of science.  
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Table 3 
Content Comparison of Gross (1990/1996) and Gross (2006)  
Rhetoric of Science Starring the Text 
Chapter Chapter Title Chapter Chapter Title 
Preface The Rhetoric of Science 1996 1 The Achievements of the Rhetoric of 
Science 
1 Rhetorical Analysis 2 The Justification of the Rhetoric of 
Science 
2 Analogy in Science 3 The Kind of Rhetoric Science Is 
3 Taxonomic Language 4 The Possibility of a Complete Rhetorical 
Description of Science: Taxonomy as 
Example 
4 The Tale of DNA   
5 Style in Biological Prose   
6 The Arrangement of the 
Scientific Paper 
  
8 Newton’s Rhetorical Conversion 5 The Possibility of a Complete Rhetorical 
Description of Science: Newton’s Opticks 
as Example 
10 The Origin of the Origin 6 The Generation of Scientific Knowledge: 
The Evolution of Evolution in Darwin’s 
Notebooks 
9 Peer Review and Scientific 
Knowledge 
7  The Initial Certification of Knowledge: 
Peer Review as the Institutionalization of 
the Consensus  
7 Copernicus and Revolutionary 
Model Building 
8 The Spread of Scientific Knowledge: The 
Initial Acceptance of Heliocentricity 
  9 The Incorporation of Claims Into 
Practice: Closure in Science and Its 
Philosophy 
  10 Science and Society: Curing Occupational 
Medicine 
11  The Emergence of Social Norm 11 Compatible Insights Between Sociology 
and Rhetoric: Priority as a Social Norm 
12 The Social Drama of 
Recombinant DNA 
  
Epilogue Reference Without Reality   
  12 Complementary Insights Among 
Disciplines: The Example of 
Incommensurability 
The appearance of Starring the Text so far has proven of interest 
foremost to rhetoricians and communication scholars, with reviews 
appearing in the Journal of Communication, the Journal of 
Business and Technical Communication, and IEEE Transactions 
on Professional Communication as well as Isis, a history of science 
journal (although, as with Lyne’s earlier review, it is written by a 
rhetorician). The tone of these reviews is in general respectful, with 
Johnson (2008) the most admiring, lauding Gross’s more modest 
 William J. White 22 Poroi 10,2 (December 2014) 
ambitions and the vision he advances of rhetoric as facilitator of 
discussions, engenderer of consensus, provocateur of conflict, and 
creator of arenas for resolution. Janas (2008) compliments the 
increased coherence of Starring the Text, and several reviewers 
acknowledge Gross’s topical range and abilities of synthesis. But 
both Keränen (2006) and Paul (2008) take issue with Gross’s use of 
Gaonkar (1993) as a major inflection point and critical touchstone 
in the rhetoric of science (see also Harris, 2009). Several seem to 
regret Gross’s efforts to exorcise the radical epistemological 
inferences that characterized The Rhetoric of Science. Janas says 
that Gross has moved from “revolutionary prophet to conventional 
practitioner,” suggesting that one of the main features of the 
original book is a historical significance now lacking in the revision. 
Paul intends to stick with The Rhetoric of Science in her classes, 
since the value of the work for her is how it is a product of its 
historical moment. Wynne (2007) seems not to believe Gross’s 
renunciation of radicalism, given that the exorcism of that language 
is incomplete in the nuts and bolts of the chapters that have been 
carried forward from the older editions, regardless of how the 
transitions have been rewritten. In short, reviewers of Starring the 
Text seem to acknowledge Gross’s intentions, but to have doubts 
about the contemporaneous relevance of the revised book or its 
project. “Those seeking the growing socially salient, policy-focused 
vein of rhetoric of science will need to look elsewhere,” Keränen 
says (Keränen, 2006, 867).  
The same pattern seems to hold true for citations to the 2006 
book. Of the 80 articles that cited at least one version of the book 
between 2006 and 2011, 19 (24%) cited Starring the Text. This 
includes five book reviews. Removing those as well as five 
unavailable articles left 9 articles, four of which were classified as 
incorporation, one as excavation, three as sublimation, and one as 
reflexion. These are proportionally indistinguishable from the 
distribution across citation context categories of the Rhetorical 
Science Studies cluster, .2(3)=15.4, n.s., although Starring the Text 
shows slightly greater incorporation (44% vs. 33%) and slightly less 
sublimation (33% vs. 48%) than does The Rhetoric of Science.  
Should those proportions hold steady over time, signaling a real 
difference in the use of the different versions of the book, it may 
indicate that Gross’s movement away from asserting the 
disciplinarity of rhetoric of science will have made it easier for his 
work to be actively used by the broader science studies 
community—at the cost, however, of weakening the claim of the 
rhetorician of science to a unique disciplinary identity. As Isager 
and Just say in a similar context, “the rhetoricians gradually 
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disappear from the picture, leaving only their basic tools behind” 
(Isager and Just, 2005, 252). Given that its indiscriminate 
“globalization” has been cited as a source of the philosophical 
incoherence of rhetoric of science (Collier, 2005; Gaonkar, 1993), 
this may not be a bad thing. However, from a social epistemological 
standpoint, it commits to what may be called a non-disciplinary 
strategy, wherein “legitimacy for the field is sought primarily 
through association with and service to ‘real’ disciplines” 
(Shepherd, 1993, 88). “We can argue for the importance of 
maintaining such a non-disciplinary field,” he goes on, “but [we] 
will constantly struggle against charges of incoherence and 
triviality” (89).  
Conclusion  
This study began to explore the disciplinarity of the rhetoric of 
science by using Alan Gross’s movement away from the radical 
rhetoric of science as its stalking horse. It describes the “refiguring” 
of The Rhetoric of Science into Starring the Text as Gross’s 
response to internal and external criticism of the epistemological 
position implicit in the first edition. The criticism was largely the 
consequence of the strategy of disciplinarity the first text adopted, 
in which rhetoric is asserted to be ontologically foundational of 
science (cf. Shepherd, 1993). This position aligned Gross in the eyes 
of external readers with the radical (i.e., non-Mertonian, social 
constructionist, epistemologically relativist) wing of science studies. 
Additionally, it helped prompt internal criticism within the field of 
communication in general as well as rhetoric specifically about the 
unwarranted globalization or totalization of rhetoric.  
In the decade and a half following the publication of The 
Rhetoric of Science, much of Gross’s work amounted to a walking-
back of his proclamation of a field called rhetoric of science, 
culminating in a revamped, retitled version of his book. Meanwhile, 
others have made use of The Rhetoric of Science in their own work, 
using it primarily as a device for identifying “rhetoric of science” as 
a field related to science studies (sublimation) and to some degree 
as a source of useful or important claims, methods, or other 
insights (incorporation) within psychology, science studies, and 
speech communication. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it 
may be that the changes Gross made to the book, particularly the 
title change, make it less useful in the former capacity as well as less 
relevant as what Lakatos called a programmatic exemplar for 
rhetoricians of science (Lakatos, 1970)—even if it does turn out to 
be more congenial to incorporation into science studies work.  
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Additionally, the model of citation practices offered here 
provides a conceptual frame for making sense of the empirical 
citation context schema offered in the bibliometric literature. It 
thus serves as a contribution to a theory of citations capable of 
grappling with their multivalent character (Leydesdorff, 1998). It is 
at root a rhetorical theory, acknowledging the agency of scholars in 
their decisions about whom to cite, but it positions that agency 
within the confines of disciplinarity such that citers are powerfully 
motivated to cite others in a way that positions their work as 
simultaneously different from but relevant to the work of other 
scholars. It thus goes some way toward answering the question of 
how citations persuade, to the extent that they do.  
Copyright © 2014 William J. White 
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